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Non-compliance of firms with tax regulations is a major constraint on state capacity in developing
countries. We focus on an arguably under-appreciated dimension of non-compliance: under-
reporting of wages by formal firms to evade payroll taxes. Comparing wage distributions for
similar sets of workers in the administrative records of the Mexican social security agency and a
household labor-force survey, we document extensive under-reporting of wages. We further argue
that the 1997 Mexican pension reform had a differential effect by age on the incentives of workers
to ensure that their wages were reported accurately. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, we
present evidence that the increase in the incentive for workers to ensure accurate reports led to
a significant decline in under-reporting. The results suggest that enlisting workers in monitoring
their employers is an effective way to increase payroll tax compliance.
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1 Introduction
A growing body of research suggests that lack of state capacity — in particular, difficulty in raising
taxes to fund the provision of public goods — is a major constraint on the growth of developing
countries (Burgess and Stern, 1993; Besley and Persson, 2009, 2011). Developing countries tend to
have low ratios of tax revenues to GDP and large informal sectors. Mexico is no exception: it has
the lowest tax revenue share of GDP in the OECD, between 15 and 20 percent during the period
we study, and the informal sector is estimated to make up 40 percent or more of total output
(OECD, 2011b; IMF, 2010; Schneider and Enste, 2000). The Mexican social security agency, the
Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS), is in principle supposed to cover all private-sector
employees; in fact it covers slightly more than half.1 Given weak enforcement institutions and
widespread evasion, the task of improving the fiscal capacity of developing-country governments
is a difficult one, and there is acute policy interest in potential remedies.
A key element of the general weakness of fiscal capacity is non-compliance of firms with tax
regulations. A large literature has focused on one dimension of non-compliance: the failure of
firms to register with tax authorities. Researchers have argued that this form of non-compliance
generates a variety of market distortions, including limits on informal firms’ employment growth
and access to formal credit markets (Gordon and Li, 2009; La Porta and Shleifer, 2008; Levy,
2008).2 Governments in a number of countries have implemented programs to reduce registration
costs and induce firms to formalize.3
In this paper, we focus on a different dimension of non-compliance by firms, less appreciated
but arguably no less important: the under-reporting of wages by registered firms to evade payroll
taxes. This form of non-compliance has received surprisingly little empirical attention. One reason
may be that it has been shown not to be a significant issue in developed countries. For instance,
using audits of individual tax returns in Denmark, Kleven et al (2011) find little evasion when
1In 2000, the ratio of remunerated employees (trabajadores asalariados) covered by IMSS to remunerated private
sector employees in the Mexican population census was 0.528. Sources: IMSS (2009) for numerator and INEGI
(2001), using information from 2000 population census, for denominator. We note that IMSS uses different series
to calculate coverage in its published statistics; see details in Appendix B.1 (online).
2Notable theoretical work on firms’ decisions about whether to formalize includes Rauch (1991), De Paula and
Scheinkman (2011), and Galiani and Weinschelbaum (forthcoming).
3See for instance Bruhn (2011) and Kaplan, Piedra, and Seira (forthcoming) on the SARE program in Mexico
and Fajnzylber, Maloney, and Montes-Rojas (2011) and Monteiro and Assunção (forthcoming) on the SIMPLES
program in Brazil. A notable recent study by de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2012) randomized cash payments
to induce small Sri Lankan firms to register, finding strong effects on registration but generally modest effects of
registration on other firm-level outcomes. The paper finds significant effects on mean profitability, which are driven
by a few fast-growing firms, and on the level of trust in the state expressed by entrepreneurs. In related work,
McKenzie and Sakho (2010) find empirically that registering leads firms to be more profitable on average, but also
find significant heterogeneity in the effects.
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incomes are reported by employers or other third parties.4 The view that third-party reporting
is effective in ensuring compliance is widespread among practitioners and government agencies in
developed countries (see e.g. OECD (2006)). Another reason for the limited attention to wage
under-reporting may be that it is difficult to study. It has been rare for researchers to have micro-
level information on firms’ wage reports, and rarer still to have access to an alternative source
of wage information at a sufficiently disaggregated level to permit inferences about the extent of
non-compliance (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002, Sec. 4.1.1). As a consequence, it has not been clear
to what extent the accuracy of third-party reporting carries over to developing-country settings.
In this paper, we draw on two independent sources of individual-level wage information from
Mexico — firms’ wage reports to the Mexican social security agency and workers’ responses to
a household labor-force survey — to draw inferences about the extent of wage under-reporting
and how it responds to incentives inherent in the social security system. We make two main
points. First, comparing wage distributions from each source for similar sets of workers, we show
graphically that under-reporting of wages is substantial, and the pattern is consistent with what
one would expect given the schedules of social security taxes and benefits. Second, using a major
pension reform in 1997 as a source of exogenous variation, we show that under-reporting responds
to changes in economic incentives, and in particular to the ability and incentives of employees
to ensure the accuracy of their employers’ reports. On July 1, 1997, the Mexican government
switched from a pay-as-you-go pension system to a system of personalized savings accounts.
Prior to the reform, the pensions of a significant subset of workers were largely insensitive to
the wages reported by firms, for reasons we discuss below. The reform tied individual pensions
more closely to firms’ wage reports and made it easier for employees to observe those reports.
The change affected different age groups differently. Workers already in the pay-as-you-go system
prior to July 1, 1997 retained the right to choose, at the time of retirement, the pension that
they would have received under the pre-reform regime. Because older workers had little time to
accumulate sufficient balances in their personal accounts, they could be confident, even at the
time of the reform, that they would be better off under the old regime. Younger workers had a
greater expectation of being better off under the new regime and hence had stronger incentives to
ensure accurate reporting. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, we show that under-reporting
4In another example, Saez (2010) finds significant bunching around the first kink point of the Earned Income Tax
Credit, suggesting misreporting, only among the self-employed. The Internal Revenue Service has documented that
compliance is higher for income groups with greater third-party reporting in the U.S. (Internal Revenue Service,
1996, 2006).
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declined relatively more for younger workers.
Our results are broadly consistent with the theoretical model of firms as fiscal intermediaries
of Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2009). In that model, firms are cooperatives of workers who may
collude in under-reporting wages to the government.5 There are two reasons why collusion may
be more difficult to sustain in larger firms, in cases where workers are unable to commit not to
“blow the whistle” on evasion. First, workers may be subject to random shocks (e.g. may become
disgruntled); since it only requires one worker to signal to the authorities that a firm should be
audited, collusion is more difficult to sustain in larger firms. Second, the government may offer a
reward for whistle-blowing that increases in the amount of taxes evaded, in which case workers in
larger firms have a greater incentive to expose evasion and firms optimally evade less. It would
be straightforward to tailor the model to our setting. Although there is no explicit reward for
whistle-blowing in Mexico, the shift to personal retirement accounts can be thought of as an
increase in the incentive for workers to ensure accurate reporting. This increase in the reward for
monitoring would be expected to increase compliance by firms employing workers affected by the
change.6
This paper appears to be the first empirical study of the extent to which under-reporting of
wages by employers responds to changes in the incentives and ability of employees to monitor
them. Our findings support the idea that the design of social-insurance systems should take into
account the incentives of employees to ensure accurate reporting. This argument should not be
interpreted as advocating a system of personal accounts per se; one could imagine a change in
pension benefits under the pay-as-you-go system that would have had similar effects. The key
point is that giving employees greater incentives to monitor their employers and making it easier
for them to do so appear to be effective ways to improve payroll tax compliance.
The argument of this paper is in the spirit of recent work on the attractive enforcement
properties of value-added taxes (VATs) relative to retail sales taxes (Kopczuk and Slemrod, 2006;
Keen and Lockwood, 2010; Pomeranz, 2011). VATs are thought to reduce administrative costs of
enforcement in part because each party in a supply-chain transaction has an incentive to ensure
that the other reports accurately. Our argument that incentivizing employees to monitor reports
of their employers can improve payroll-tax compliance is analogous.7
5The possibility of collusion between employees and employers in under-reporting wages had earlier been for-
malized by Yaniv (1992).
6In the presence of disgruntlement shocks, such a model would continue to predict greater compliance in larger
firms, consistent with patterns we document below.
7Bailey and Turner (2001) suggest that tying pension benefits to contributions in this way would have the effect
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This paper is related to a small literature on misreporting of social security contributions.
Nyland, Smyth, and Zhu (2006) relate the outcomes of social-security tax audits in Shanghai to
firm characteristics. Tonin (2011) investigates the effect of an imposition of a minimum wage on
reporting patterns in Hungary, using the relationship between household income and expenditures
to draw inferences about the extent of evasion.8 These papers do not focus on workers’ incentives
to monitor their firms.9
This paper is related more broadly to an active recent literature on the role of firms in tax
systems, discussed in more detail in Kopczuk and Slemrod (2006), Slemrod (2008), and Gordon
and Li (2009), and more broadly still to a voluminous literature on tax evasion and avoidance,
reviewed by Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998), Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002), and Saez,
Slemrod, and Giertz (2012).
The next section describes the Mexican social security system and the 1997 pension reform.
Section 3 describes the datasets. Section 4 presents cross-sectional comparisons of the wage
distributions in the different datasets. Section 5 presents the difference-in-differences analysis of
the effect of the pension reform. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Mexican Social Security System
Because our empirical strategy relies crucially on incentives in the Mexican social insurance sys-
tem, this section describes the system and the 1997 pension reform in some detail. The Instituto
Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS), the Mexican social security agency, is the primary source of
social insurance for private-sector workers in Mexico. It administers pension benefits, disability
insurance, work injury compensation, childcare centers, and a large number of clinics and hospi-
tals, which are the primary source of health care for the formal, private-sector Mexican workforce.
Public-sector workers and workers for PEMEX, the state-owned oil company, are covered by sepa-
rate systems. In 2003, the government created an alternative system called Seguro Popular, which
provides basic health coverage for all individuals and is not tied to formal employment. In this
paper, we focus on the IMSS system and sectors with minimal government employment.
of reducing evasion.
8Also using Hungarian data, Elek, Köllő, Reizer, and Szabó (forthcoming) develop a method to identify workers
whose wages are likely to be under-reported, using the responses of wages to a change in the level of reported wages
at which audits may be triggered.
9Papers that have used the general strategy of comparing information from more than one data source in order
to infer evasion (in other contexts) include Fisman and Wei (2004), Gorodnichenko, Martinez-Vazquez, and Peter
(2009), Marion and Muehlegger (2008), Hurst, Li, and Pugsley (2011), and Braguinsky, Mityakov, and Liscovich
(2010) among others.
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Beginning with its creation in 1944, IMSS operated as a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) scheme
financed by payroll taxes. By the late 1980s, however, rising health care costs and an increase
in the number of pensioners relative to the working-age population led to projected shortfalls in
the IMSS financial accounts. Because of concerns about the financial viability of the system, the
Mexican congress enacted a first attempt at pension reform in 1992. That reform created personal
retirement accounts to exist alongside the PAYGO system. The personal retirement accounts were
plagued by administrative problems and did not resolve the underlying financial imbalance in the
PAYGO program, however. In December 1995, the congress enacted a new, more comprehensive
pension reform, to take effect on July 1, 1997. As mentioned above, this reform replaced the
entire PAYGO pension system with a system of personal retirement accounts (PRA). Because of
data constraints, discussed in more detail in Section 3 below, we focus on the years 1988-2003.
More extensive discussions of the pension reform are provided in Grandolini and Cerda (1998),
Sales-Sarrapy, Solis-Soberon, and Villagomez-Amezcua (1996), and Aguila (2011).
In describing the characteristics of the social security system and in the empirical work below,
we will focus primarily on male workers. The incentives and empirical patterns for women are
complicated by the facts that women’s labor force participation changed relatively rapidly over
the study period and that many women receive IMSS benefits through their spouses, which
provides an incentive to remain in the informal sector. In addition, because of relatively low labor
force participation by older women, sample sizes in the ENEU household survey are inadequate,
especially when analyzing the data separately by metropolitan area, as explained below. We
present the main tables and figures for women in Appendix C (online). To preview the results,
our cross-sectional point — that there is substantial evasion — is robust for women, but our
difference-in-differences results are not, possibly for the reasons just discussed.
2.1 Contribution Rates
IMSS requires contributions from both employers and employees based on reported wages; these
are supplemented by government contributions. Figure 1 presents the contribution schedule for
employers as a function of the reported real daily wages of each employee, for selected years.
The schedule reflects a complicated set of formulas determining contributions to the various
components of the IMSS system, principally health care, pension, and child care.10 The figure
illustrates that the most significant changes in the schedule are for the highest-wage workers,
10Full details are presented in Appendix Tables A1 and A2 (online).
5
earning above 500 pesos per day, due to changes in the maximum taxable income over the period,
from 10 times to 25 times the minimum wage in Mexico City.11 The topcodes apply to no more
than 5 percent of wage-earners in any year and will play little role in our analysis. The total
employer contribution varied between 18 percent and 22 percent of the wage over the range in
which almost all workers fall. There was an increase in the employer contribution from 1990 to
1993, and then the reform in 1997 introduced a kink in the schedule, which raised contributions
disproportionately on the lowest-wage workers. Figures 2 displays worker contributions, which
vary between 2 percent and 5 percent over the relevant range and declined with the 1997 reform.
Overall, while there were changes in the contribution schedules, these were relatively modest over
the relevant wage range. Looking ahead to the empirical strategy we implement in Section 5, we
also note that the changes in contributions were the same for all age groups and their effects will
be differenced out in our difference-in-differences procedure.
2.2 Non-pension Benefits
Any worker on whose behalf contributions are made to the system (regardless of the wage reported)
is entitled to free health care at IMSS hospitals and clinics, for himself or herself, as well as for
members of his or her immediate family. In addition, working mothers and widowed or divorced
working fathers covered by IMSS in their jobs are entitled to free child care during workdays for
children ages seven weeks to four years old.12 It is difficult to estimate workers’ valuations of these
non-pension benefits. Conveniently for our empirical strategy, however, the health care and child
care benefits did not change with the 1997 pension reform. Under the assumption that employees’
valuations of the constant set of benefits did not change differentially by age group over the study
period, the valuations will be differenced out in our difference-in-differences procedure.13
2.3 Pension Benefits
The pension system is the component of the social security system that experienced the largest
change over our study period. Here we describe the pre-reform and post-reform regimes separately.
11There are three minimum wage zones in Mexico, corresponding to higher-, medium- and lower-wage municipal-
ities, respectively. The minimum wage in Mexico City is typically used for indexing purposes, and where we refer
to the minimum wage (without specifying zone) we are referring to the minimum wage in Mexico City.
12IMSS also provides an individual savings account for housing expenditures, which in some cases can be used to
contribute to an individual pensions. See Appendix A.2 (online) for details.
13There has been a secular decline in the number of IMSS hospital and clinic beds per covered individual, but
there was no trend break in 1997 (IMSS, 2011, ch. 11). Below we will find no pre-trend in under-reporting prior to
1997.
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2.3.1 Pre-reform (pay-as-you-go) system
Under the pre-reform regime, workers became vested in the system after 10 years of contributions,
and were then entitled to receive at least the minimum pension. Pensions were calculated on the
basis of the final average wage, defined as the average nominal wage in the five years preceding
retirement. Panel A of Figure 3 illustrates the expected daily pension as a function of the final
average wage for workers with 10, 20 and 30 years of contributions in selected years. The schedules
combine a minimum pension guarantee with a benefit proportional to an individual’s wage. At
first glance, the pension values illustrated in Panel A do not appear to be insensitive to the
reported final average wage, but it is important to note that in the years leading up to the reform
inflation had severely eroded the real value of wages and pensions, such that a large majority
of workers had final average wages in the region in which the minimum was binding. Inflation
exceeded 50 percent in every year in the volatile 1982-1988 period, and exceeded 100 percent in
1987 and 1988; it remained above 15 percent in a number of subsequent years (1989-1992 and
1995-1999); see Appendix Table A4 (online). In response to public pressure, the Mexican congress
in 1989 increased the minimum pension to 70 percent of the minimum wage and indexed it to the
minimum wage going forward, without raising the value of pensions greater than the minimum.14
Over time, the congress also raised the value of the minimum pension relative to the minimum
wage, until it reached 100 percent of the minimum wage in Mexico City in 1995.
As a consequence of the erosion of the real value of pensions above the minimum and the
legislative interventions to raise the minimum, the fraction of workers who expected to receive the
minimum pension remained high throughout the pre-reform period. Panel B of Figure 3 plots the
real value of the pension for male workers with 10, 20 or 30 years of contributions against the final
average wage percentile of 60-65 year old men in the IMSS data, for selected years.15 In 1990,
approximately 80 percent of male retirees with 10 years of contributions received the minimum
pension. The corresponding numbers for male workers with 20 or 30 years of contributions were
70 percent and 60 percent respectively. In 1997, just prior to the implementation of the pension
reform, nearly all workers with 10 years of contributions, roughly 50 percent of those with 20
14In 1991, benefits were indexed to the minimum wage, which slowed the erosion of the values of pensions above
the minimum. That is, if a worker’s final average wage was twice the minimum wage in 1991, the pension payment
in 1992 was calculated on the basis of twice the minimum wage. The real minimum wage declined steadily over the
period (see Appendix Table A4 (online)) so the slowing of the erosion of pensions as a result of this change was
modest.
15To calculate the final average wage percentile, we calculate the nominal wage at each percentile of the IMSS
wage distribution for 60-65 year old men in each of preceding five years, then take the average for each percentile.
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years, and 40 percent of those with 30 years could expect to receive the minimum pension.16
Unfortunately, the data to which we have access do not contain total years of contributions by each
individual worker, and hence we are not able to calculate the precise number of workers receiving
the minimum pension. But analysts with access to this information report that approximately
80 percent of retirees were receiving the minimum pension prior to the reform (Grandolini and
Cerda, 1998).
Strictly speaking, pension values were insensitive to under-reporting only for those workers
whose true wage corresponded to the minimum pension. If wages were under-reported to IMSS,
as we argue below, then the graphs in Panel B likely overstate the fraction of workers whose
pensions were insensitive to under-reporting. To address this, in Panel C we plot similar graphs
using final average wage percentiles calculated from the ENEU household data (described in
Section 3 below), which should not be subject to under-reporting. We see that somewhat smaller
fractions of workers with 10, 20 and 30 years of contributions would have received the minimum
pension. But the key point is that the graph for 1997 resembles quite closely the corresponding
graph in Panel B: essentially all workers with 10 years of contributions would have received the
minimum pension, as well as more than 40 percent of workers with 20 years and more than 20
percent of workers with 30 years. The similarity between the graphs for 1997 in Panels B and C
suggest that the number of workers who would have received the minimum pension under accurate
reporting was not far below the 80 percent figure reported above.
2.3.2 Post-reform (personal retirement accounts) system
Under the personal retirement account (PRA) system, employees, employers and the government
are required to make contributions to workers’ personal retirement accounts in each period. Over
the 1997-2003 period, employers were required to contribute 5.15 percent of each employee’s wage,
and employees 1.125 percent; the government contributed 0.225 percent, as well as a “social
quota” equal to 5.5 percent of the current minimum wage in Mexico City. Each worker is required
to choose an investment institution, known as an Administrador de Fondos de Ahorro para el
Retiro (AFORE) [Retirement Savings Fund Administrator], to manage his or her account.17 The
16In addition, there was a penalty for retirement before age 65 of 5 percent per year (i.e. a worker who retired
at age 60 would have his or her pension reduced by 25 percent), but this penalty was not allowed to reduce
the pension below the minimum. This reduced the disincentive to retire early to workers with pensions near the
minimum (Aguila, 2011).
17The AFORE management fees are in many cases substantial, and it is not clear that workers choose AFOREs
optimally. Duarte and Hastings (2010) investigate the role of behavioral issues in employees’ choices of AFOREs.
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AFOREs are regulated by a government agency, the Comisión Nacional del Sistema de Ahorro
para el Retiro (CONSAR) [National Retirement Savings Commission]. The reform also specified
a minimum pension equal to the minimum wage on July 1, 1997, with further increases in the
minimum pension indexed to the Consumer Price Index. Eligibility for the minimum pension was
raised from 10 years of contributions to 25 years of contributions. The standard retirement age
remained 65.
Under the personal-account system, individuals have three options upon retirement. One is
to receive programmed withdrawals from the individual’s AFORE, where the withdrawal amount
is calculated based on the account balance as well as the age and life expectancy of the individual
and dependents.18 A second option is to purchase an annuity from a private insurance company
that guarantees a fixed monthly pension. A third option, available to workers with a personal-
account balance exceeding 130 percent of the cost of an annuity providing a monthly payment
equal to the minimum pension, is to take a lump sum payment upon retirement.
The establishment of the new pension regime created two categories of workers: “transition”
workers who first registered with IMSS before July 1, 1997, and new workers who first registered
after July 1, 1997. At retirement, transition workers are given a choice between receiving pension
benefits under the PAYGO scheme or the PRA scheme. The PAYGO pension is calculated as if
workers’ post-reform contributions were under the old regime. If a transition worker opts for the
PAYGO pension, IMSS appropriates the balance of his or her personal retirement account. The
only option for new workers is the PRA.
To illustrate the impact of the reform on pension wealth, we conduct a simulation of pension
wealth under the two regimes, based on a similar simulation by Aguila (2011). Table 1 displays
the real present value of pension wealth under the two schemes for male workers who entered the
IMSS system on June 30, 1997, and hence retained the right to opt for the old-regime pension.
In carrying out the simulation, we choose a relatively optimistic annual return on the personal
accounts: 8.59 percent, the average return from 1998-2002, as in the more optimistic of the two
scenarios considered by Aguila (2011). We also assume that, for pensions above the minimum,
participants expected the real value of the minimum wage to decline, as it had done for more than
a decade (see Appendix Table A4). Assumptions of lower interest rates and less rapid declines in
the real minimum wage are less favorable to the PRAs. Details of the simulation are in Appendix
A.3 (online).
18A worker who receives the minimum pension must choose this option.
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There are three main points to notice about the simulation. First, workers with fewer than 10
years of contributions are better off under the new regime, since they receive no pension under
the old regime but a small pension under the new regime.19 Second, for workers with 10 or more
years of contributions, the relative attractiveness of the new-regime pension is increasing as one
moves to the right and up in the table: the PRA pension is relatively more attractive for workers
with higher wages and more years of contributions. Third, conditional on having wages below
200 pesos per day (which applies to 80 percent of our samples) and qualifying for the minimum
PAYGO pension, the PRA pension only dominates the PAYGO pension for workers who expect
to contribute to the personal account for 20 or more years. For workers at the minimum wage, the
PRA pension never dominates, and for workers earning 100 pesos per day the PRA pension only
begins to dominate with more than 25 years of contributions. To save space, we do not report
simulation results for transition workers with more years of contributions before 1997, but the
basic points are the same. In particular, for workers with at least 10 years of contributions, in the
lower four-fifths of the wage distribution, the PRA is expected to be preferable to the PAYGO
pension only for those with 20+ years of contributions to the personal account.
We do not attempt to infer from the simulation exact crossing points at which the PRA
becomes preferable to the PAYGO pension; any such calculation would be sensitive to assumptions
about the path of interest and inflation rates, and it is not clear that workers are sophisticated
in calculating the precise values of pensions under the different systems. The basic message of
the simulation, which we believe was understood by participants at the time of the reform, is
that for most workers, conditional on qualifying for the minimum pension under the old regime,
the personal accounts could be expected to be relatively more attractive only for workers with a
significant number of years of contributions after 1997.
Another aspect of the pension reform, which appears to be important in practice, is that the
law requires AFOREs to send an account statement to each holder of a personal retirement account
every four months. A redacted example of such an account statement appears as Figure 4. The
account statement reports previous balances (saldo anterior), new contributions (aportaciones),
withdrawals (retiros), interest earned (rendimientos), AFORE commissions charged (comisiones),
and final balances (saldo final) for the pension account as well as for two additional accounts (a
voluntary savings account and a housing savings account). The bottom section reports 3-year
returns and commissions for each AFORE, as well as the average 5-year net return (at left). It
19Many women with weak labor-force attachment may fall into this category, which may explain part of the
difference in results between women and men mentioned above and discussed in more detail in Appendix C (online).
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appears that these account statements made it significantly easier for workers to discover how
much employers were contributing on their behalf. This mechanism would not be expected to
reduce evasion if employers and employees were colluding in under-reporting wages, but it may
have reduced evasion in cases in which workers were unaware that their employers were under-
reporting their wages.
The social security law provides for fines if establishments are caught evading taxes. The fines
ranged from 70-100 percent of the amount of evasion over the 1995-2001 period, and have ranged
from 40-100 percent, with most exactly at 40 percent, since 2001. In practical terms, however,
IMSS has not had the resources to do extensive auditing of employers. Neither before nor after the
reform was there a reward to employees for revealing evasion by their employers, beyond ensuring
accurate reporting of their own wages.
As will be seen below, one aspect of IMSS reporting requirements does appear to be strictly
enforced. By law, firms in Mexico are required to pay the relevant minimum wage and a holiday
bonus called an aguinaldo, worth two weeks of salary — approximately 4.5 percent of annual
earnings. In order to avoid fines, establishments are required to report wages of at least the
corresponding minimum wage plus 4.5 percent throughout the year. Prior to 1991, there are a
scattered few reports of wages below this level; beginning in 1991, IMSS stepped up enforcement
of this rule and such wages have no longer been observed.
2.4 Other Dimensions of Tax System in Mexico
One reason that firms in developed countries engage in relatively little under-reporting of wages
may be that it does little to reduce their overall tax burden. If corporate or personal income taxes
are as high as payroll taxes and difficult to evade, then lower payroll taxes due to under-reporting
will be offset by higher taxes on corporate or personal income. In Mexico, corporate and personal
income taxes are generally higher than payroll taxes. The corporate income tax rate went from 39
to 34 percent over the 1988-2003 period.20 But tax evasion and avoidance are rife in Mexico. For
instance, the OECD in 1992 found that, in part due to various loopholes, 70 percent of corporate
tax declarations reported no taxable income (OECD, 1992). By all accounts, tax evasion remains
high (OECD, 2011a). In addition, the social security agency and the Mexican tax authority first
signed an agreement to share data in June 2002; thus for almost all of the period under study,
there was no chance that information reported to the social security agency would affect the
20Source: OECD Tax Database, www.oecd.org/ctp/taxdatabase.
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corporate tax burden. It appears, in other words, that over the study period payroll taxes evaded
by under-reporting wages could be pocketed by firms, and were not offset by increases in other
taxes.21
Also, it does not appear that individual income taxes provided a strong disincentive to most
workers to have their wages reported accurately. Mexico provides extensive tax credits for low-
wage workers, originally instituted to offset the regressive effects of VATs, with the consequence
that many workers legally pay no income tax, or even receive funds from the tax authority (i.e.
face a negative income tax.) In 1997, for instance, individuals making less than 3.2 times the
minimum wage in Mexico City faced a non-positive tax rate (OECD, 1999, p. 80).
3 Data
The source for establishments’ wage reports are IMSS administrative records. All private Mexican
employers are in principle legally obligated to report wages for their employees, and pay social-
security taxes on the basis of the reports. The IMSS dataset contains the full set of wage reports for
employees in registered, private-sector establishments over the period 1985-2005.22 The dataset
contains a limited set of variables: age, sex, daily wage (including benefits), state and year of the
individual’s first registration with IMSS, an employer-specific identifier, and industry and location
of the employer. Wages are reported in spells (with a begin and end date for each wage level) and
in theory we could construct a day-by-day wage history for each individual. To keep the dataset
manageable, we extract wages for a single day, June 30, in each year. Prior to 1997, records for
temporary workers were not collected in digital form. To ensure comparability before and after
1997, we focus on workers identified in the IMSS data as permanent, defined as having a written
contract of indefinite duration.
We select ages 16-65. To maintain consistency across years, we impose the lowest real value
of the IMSS topcode (which occurred in 1991) in all years. We drop establishments with a single
insured worker, since these are likely to be self-employed workers.23 In the interests of com-
parability with the ENEU data, we include only the metropolitan areas included in the ENEU
samples (described below). We also focus on sectors for which we are confident that IMSS is
21Madzharova (2011) provides a formalization of the idea that lower corporate taxes give firms greater incentives
to under-report wages. Empirically, however, the evidence she presents suggests that changes in corporate tax rates
do not have a large effect on wage reports in Bulgaria.
22The data have been used in several previous papers, including Castellanos, Garcia-Verdu, and Kaplan (2004),
and Fŕıas, Kaplan, and Verhoogen (2009).
23Including these single-worker establishments has no effect on the results reported below.
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the only available formal-sector social insurance program: manufacturing, construction, and re-
tail/hotel/restaurants. Other sectors contain a larger share of public employees, and it is not clear
that we would be able to treat workers not covered by IMSS as belonging to the informal sector.
We refer to the sample selected following these criteria as our IMSS baseline sample. Further
details are in Appendix B.1 (online).
The household data we use are from the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano (ENEU) [Na-
tional Urban Employment Survey], a household survey modeled on the Current Population Survey
(CPS) in the United States, collected by the Instituto Nacional de Estad́ısticas y Geograf́ıa (IN-
EGI), the Mexican statistical agency. The original ENEU sample, beginning in 1987, focused on
the 16 largest Mexican metropolitan areas; although the coverage expanded over time, to max-
imize the number of pre-reform years we focus on the original 16 areas. As in the IMSS data,
we include male workers ages 16-65, focus the second quarter of each year, exclude self-employed
workers, impose the 1991 IMSS topcode in all years, and include only manufacturing, construc-
tion, and retail/hotels/restaurants. All calculations below use the sampling weights provided by
INEGI.
A very useful feature of the ENEU for our purposes is that it asks respondents whether they
receive IMSS coverage as an employment benefit. Beginning in the third quarter of 1994, the
ENEU also asked respondents whether they had a written contract of indefinite duration, the
legal definition of a permanent employee used by IMSS. Hourly wages are calculated as monthly
wages divided by 4.3 times hours worked in the previous week, and daily wages as 8 times hourly
wages. The ENEU wage measures are based on respondents’ reports of take-home pay, and do not
include respondents’ social security contributions or other taxes paid. They also exclude bonuses
paid less frequently than monthly, and hence exclude the yearly aguinaldo bonus. The differences
between the IMSS and the ENEU wage measures are discussed further in Appendix B (online).
We drop workers with reported daily wages below 30 pesos (in 2002 constant pesos, approximately
US$3, which is approximately 50 percent of the minimum wage.) In principle, both the IMSS and
the ENEU data are available over the 1987-2005 period, but in the interest of consistency over
time in the ENEU we focus on the years 1988-2003.24
Our goal in the preparation of the datasets is to construct samples in the IMSS and ENEU
data that are as similar as possible. Table 2 presents summary statistics for the IMSS baseline
24There appear to be a number of data inconsistencies in the ENEU in 1987, the first year of the survey. The
ENEU sampling scheme was redesigned in the third quarter of 2003; to avoid introducing inconsistencies (with little
benefit, since the IMSS data are available only until 2005) we focus on the period before the redesign.
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sample and various ENEU samples for 1990 and 2000, for a set of variables that are common
between the sources: daily wage, age, and share in large establishments (with more than 100
employees). Column 2 contains the “full” ENEU sample, containing all non-self-employed men
satisfying the age and sector criteria. Comparing columns 3 and 4, we see that ENEU workers
with IMSS coverage tend to be higher-wage and more likely to work in large establishments than
workers without IMSS coverage.
Column 5 contains the sample that in principle should be the best match for the IMSS baseline
sample: ENEU workers who report receiving IMSS coverage and having a written contract of
indefinite duration — that is, who satisfy the definition of “permanent” used by IMSS. The
average wage for this ENEU sample is greater than for the IMSS baseline sample, consistent
with our argument below that there is under-reporting of wages in the IMSS data. Because the
contract-type variable is available only beginning in 1994, however, we have prohibitively few
years of pre-reform data for this sample. Instead, we will focus hereafter on the Column 6 sample,
ENEU workers who report receiving IMSS coverage and working full-time (i.e. at least 35 hours
in the previous week), which can be defined consistently over the entire period. We refer to the
Column 6 sample as our ENEU baseline sample.
The ENEU baseline sample is not an ideal comparison group, for several reasons. Some
temporary workers may work full-time, and some permanent workers may work part-time. Com-
paring Columns 5 and 6 for the year 2000, we see that average wages are significantly lower in
the Column 6 sample; this is attributable to the facts that temporary full-time workers earn rel-
atively low wages and that permanent part-time workers earn relatively high wages on average.
It may also be that firms interpret “permanent” to mean something different from the legal def-
inition (i.e written contract of indefinite duration) when reporting wages. In addition, patterns
of non-response may differ between the IMSS and ENEU samples. It is well known, for instance,
that richer households tend to be less likely to respond to income questions in household surveys
(Groves and Couper, 1998; Korinek, Mistiaen, and Ravallion, 2006). The weighted employment
totals from the ENEU data in Columns 5 and 6 are below the IMSS totals in Column 1; this
may in part reflect such non-response. These potential discrepancies recommend caution in in-
terpreting cross-sectional differences between the IMSS and ENEU baseline samples. It is worth
emphasizing, however, that our difference-in-difference strategy will focus on changes over time
in the discrepancies between the samples, and any time-invariant sources of discrepancy will be
differenced out.
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As a further comparison, Figure 5 plots employment totals over the 1988-2003 period for
the same samples as in Table 2. Perhaps surprisingly, we see that over most of the period the
number of workers in the IMSS sample is slightly greater than the numbers in any of the ENEU
samples. There are several potential explanations. The difference may reflect non-response by
households in the ENEU (perhaps varying systematically with income, as mentioned above). It
may be that some respondents are unaware that they receive IMSS coverage from their employer,
or believe that they are covered by the public-sector social security agency (known by the acronym
ISSSTE) when in fact they are covered by IMSS. It may also be that individuals live outside of
the boundaries of the metropolitan area in which they work, and hence are included in our IMSS
sample but not our ENEU sample. For our purposes, however, the most important lesson of the
figure is that there does not appear to have been a large change over time in the extent of the
employment discrepancy between the IMSS and ENEU samples in response to the pension reform.
4 Cross-Sectional Comparisons of Wage Distributions
In this section, we consider cross-sectional differences in wage distributions between the IMSS
and ENEU baseline samples prior to the 1997 pension reform. As discussed in Section 2 above, in
the pre-reform period the key issue for workers was simply whether or not they were in the IMSS
system; for almost all workers, the benefits that they enjoyed were insensitive to the wages that
employers reported on their behalf.
Figure 6 plots simple histograms of daily wages in the IMSS baseline sample (gray bars)
and the ENEU baseline sample (bars with black borders and no fill color) in 1990, using bins
that are 5 pesos wide. The three vertical lines between 50 and 70 pesos (approximately US$5-
US$7/day) represent the the three minimum wages in Mexico, with the rightmost corresponding
to the minimum wage in Mexico City. Figure 7 plots similar histograms using the same samples
but using only observations below 200 pesos (approximately US$20), with bins 2 pesos wide. The
pattern is striking: there is clear evidence of stacking in the IMSS sample slightly above the three
minimum wages. These stacks correspond to 104.5 percent of the minimum wages in each zone
— the minimum reports to IMSS that did not incur penalties. It is also evident that the IMSS
distribution lies largely to the left of the ENEU distribution.25 The stacking and shift to the left
25The exception to this generalization is at the far right tail. In Figure 6, we see that there is relatively more
weight at the topcode in the IMSS sample; there is also slightly more weight at high wage values just below the
topcode. This appears to reflect non-response by high-income households in the ENEU — a common pattern in
household surveys, as mentioned above.
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of the distribution is precisely what one would have expected, given the incentives inherent in the
social security system.
A key prediction of the theoretical framework of Kleven et al. (2009) is that collusion in under-
reporting wages is more difficult to sustain in larger firms. It may also be the case simply that
the intensity of IMSS monitoring and auditing is greater in larger firms. In either case, we would
expect the difference between the IMSS and ENEU wage distributions to be smaller in larger firms.
Figure 8 presents figures similar to Figure 7 (focused on daily wages below 200 pesos), separately
for five firm sizes. Caution is warranted in interpreting these figures, since observed establishment
size in the IMSS data is itself affected by firms’ compliance decisions. Subject to this caveat, it
appears that there is less stacking on the minimum allowable wage reports at larger firm sizes,
suggesting greater compliance. Even in establishments with 250 workers or more, however, there
is evidence of stacking at the minimum allowable wage report, suggesting some under-reporting
even in quite large firms.
Another insight from the taxation literature is that the larger the number of reports the tax
authorities receive from firms, the more difficult it is for firms to evade taxes. To investigate this
prediction, we consider the wage distributions for two subsets of plants that appear in plant-level
datasets collected by INEGI, the Mexican statistical agency.26 The plant-level datasets do not
contain individual-level wage information on the full distribution of wages, but it is nevertheless
instructive to consider firms’ wage reports in plants that appear in the plant-level datasets. Fig-
ure 9 plots the IMSS wage distribution for workers in manufacturing establishments that also
appear in the main Mexican longitudinal plant panel, the Encuesta Industrial Anual (EIA) [An-
nual Industrial Survey], which excludes assembly-for-export maquiladora plants.27 There is little
evidence of stacking at the minimum allowable wage values, suggesting relatively little under-
reporting of wages. The EIA sample consists mainly of plants with more than 100 employees, and
we saw above that larger plants are less likely to under-report. But the EIA plants display less
stacking even than plants in the 100-250 and >250 employees categories in Figure 8.
For the sake of completeness, Figure 10 plots the IMSS wage distribution for workers in
assembly-for-export maquiladora plants, on which monthly statistics are reported in the Es-
tad́ısticas Mensuales de la Industria Maquiladora de Exportación (EMIME) [Monthly Statistics
26INEGI does not share plant-level information collected in INEGI surveys with the Mexican tax authorities. It
is not clear that plants are aware of this, however.
27The links between establishments in the IMSS data and the EIA were constructed and first exploited in Fŕıas,
Kaplan, and Verhoogen (2009); see that paper for details of the linking.
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on Export Maquiladora Industry]. Maquiladoras captured in the EMIME generally tend to have
lower wages than the non-maquiladoras captured in the EIA. Although there is significant stacking
at the minimum allowable wage values, it is difficult to determine whether this reflects under-
reporting or simply the fact that many maquiladoras pay wages at or near the minimum.
5 Effect of 1997 Pension Reform on Under-reporting
We now consider how the differences in wage distributions between the IMSS and ENEU samples
varied over time, and in particular whether the 1997 pension reform had the expected differential
effect by age. We begin with a set of figures illustrating the key patterns. Figure 11 plots non-
parametric estimates of the wage distribution for men by age group, for three years, 1990, 1997
(the quarter before the reform), and 2003. The non-parametric densities, solid red for the IMSS
baseline sample and dashed blue for the ENEU baseline sample, are analogous to the histograms
for low wage levels in Figure 7; non-parametric densities are chosen for visual clarity. Each
column of graphs corresponds to an age group (indicated in the x-axis titles) and each row to a
year. There is an evident reduction in the extent of stacking for the youngest workers, but little
apparent change in stacking for the highest age group.
To illustrate the differential reduction in the discrepancy between wage distributions in another
way, Figure 12 plots the difference in log median wages between the IMSS and ENEU samples by
age group over the 1988-2003 period. We refer to the difference in log median wages between the
IMSS and ENEU samples as the “wage gap.” One noticeable fact is that the gap is initially larger
for the youngest age group, 16-25. But the key point is that the gap for the oldest age group,
56-65, clearly increases relative to the gaps for the other groups. The other group that appears
to see a relative increase, albeit smaller, is the second-oldest age group, 46-55.
A possible concern with Figure 12 is that the differential changes may reflect shocks to local
labor markets which differ in their age composition. To remove the effects of local labor-market
shocks, we calculate the wage gaps at the age group-year-metro area level, regress them on a full
set of metro area-year indicators, and average the residuals at the age group-year level. Figure 13
plots these averages. Again we see a clear relative increase in the wage gap in the oldest group. It
is worth noting that although there is some volatility in the estimates prior to 1997, the relative
increase in wage gaps for the oldest group only becomes evident in 1998, the first observation
after the July 1997 pension reform.
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The difference in log medians ignores much of the information contained in the shapes of
the IMSS and ENEU wage distributions. An alternative measure of the divergence between two
distributions is the Kullback-Liebler divergence (Kullback and Leibler, 1951), which has been
used by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) among others. The Kullback-Liebler divergence








While in principle this measure could be computed using the histograms displayed in Figures 6-8
(and a discrete version of the definition of D12), the measure is only defined if f2(w) is positive,
and in the histograms this cannot be guaranteed. For this reason, we first estimate non-parametric
densities at the age group-year level and then apply (1). Figure 14 plots the Kullback-Liebler
divergence measure over the 1988-2003 period, separately by age group. Once again a relative
increase in divergence for the oldest wage group is evident.
To put standard errors on the estimates, we turn to simple regressions. To keep the empirical
model parsimonious, motivated by the pension simulation in Table 1 and by the patterns in
Figures 12- 14 above, we model the differential effect by age as captured by an interaction of an
56-65 age-group indicator and a full set of year indicators. Table 3 reports the regressions. The
columns differ in the sets of dummy variables included (year effects only, year and metro area
effects, metro area-year effects in Columns 1-3, respectively) but the coefficient estimates hardly
change. Figure 15 plots the coefficients and 95-percent intervals for the column-3 specification.
Although there is some volatility in the estimates, the coefficients are relatively flat in the pre-
reform period and there is a clear increase beginning in 1997. Coefficients are significant at the
95-percent level in 1999 and 2001-2003, and at the 90-percent level in 2000. These results support
the hypothesis that the reform reduced under-reporting to a greater extent for younger workers.
Table 4 presents analogous regressions for employment gaps (log differences between employ-
ment in the ENEU and IMSS samples). Consistent with our earlier impressions from Figure 5,
there does not appear to be a systematic response of discrepancies in employment reports to the
pension reform.
An interesting question that remains open is to what extent workers are aware of under-
reporting by their employers. The theoretical framework of Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2009),
mentioned in the introduction, assumes that employees and employers must agree to under-report
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in order to do so without triggering an audit. But our empirical results can also potentially be
reconciled with an extension of the model in which workers do not actively collude but face a cost
of obtaining information about the reported wage, which they may or may not pay. The current
empirical setting is arguably not well-suited to teasing apart these two interpretations, in part
because the change in incentives (in the form of the increased dependence of pensions on reported
wages) and the change in information (in the form of the regular AFORE account statements)
occurred simultaneously. A potential way forward would be to investigate the consequences of
the reform for wage bargaining between employers and employees, for instance by estimating dif-
ferential changes in the formal-sector vs. informal-sector wage difference for observably similar
workers. We do not have exogenous variation in whether workers are in the formal or informal
sector, however, and any such estimates would be subject to concerns about endogenous selec-
tion.28 We feel that a definitive answer to the question of how much workers know about their
employers’ under-reporting must await a setting in which incentives vary separately from costs of
information, and there is exogenous variation in workers’ attachment to the formal or informal
sector. It is worth emphasizing, however, that our key empirical conclusion does not depend on
the answer to this question: regardless of whether workers actively collude in under-reporting, it
appears that the differential increase in the incentive to ensure accurate reports, together with
the decrease in the cost of observing employers’ reports, generated a differential improvement in
compliance.
6 Conclusion
Improving compliance of firms with tax regulations is a first-order policy issue in many developing
countries. Much of the debate has focused on how to induce firms to register with tax authorities
in the first place — what we might call the extensive margin of non-compliance. In this paper,
we have shown that under-reporting of wages among firms that are already registered — non-
compliance on an intensive margin — is also substantial and responds to the incentives and ability
of workers to monitor their employers. These results suggest that providing such incentives should
be a consideration in the design of social-insurance systems.
Our results also point to two potentially interesting questions for further research. First, what
28In the same empirical setting, Marrufo (2001) argues that the difference in wages between formal and informal
workers in part reflects endogenous selection and is not a sufficient basis for calculating the incidence of social
security taxes and benefits.
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are the implications of the form of non-compliance we have highlighted for measurement of the
incidence of social-insurance costs and benefits? There is a large literature on incidence, including
early influential papers by Summers (1989) and Gruber (1994) and continuing more recently with
Kugler and Kugler (2009), and Cruces, Galiani, and Kidyba (2010), but relatively little attention
has been paid to estimating incidence in the presence of endogenous non-compliance. Second,
and relatedly, does greater pressure to report accurately (i.e. which increases compliance on the
intensive margin) induce more firms to remain informal (i.e. reduce compliance on the extensive
margin)? If the costs of increased intensive-margin compliance are not entirely borne by workers
in the form of lower wages, we might well expect such an effect. More research is needed to weigh
this potential cost against the benefits of reduced payroll-tax evasion by registered firms.
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Notes: Variation in IMSS employer contribution rates at levels above 500 pesos/day are primarily due to changes
in topcodes, which varied from 10 to 25 times the minimum wage in Mexico City over the period. Average 2002
exchange rate: 9.66 pesos/dollar.
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Notes: Variation in IMSS worker contribution rates at levels above 500 pesos/day are primarily due to changes
in topcodes, which varied from 10 to 25 times the minimum wage in Mexico City over the period. Average 2002
exchange rate: 9.66 pesos/dollar.
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C. Value of pension by ENEU wage percentile, ages 60−65
10 yrs conts. 20 yrs conts. 30 yrs conts.
Notes: Final average wage (2002 pesos/day) is average nominal daily wage over five years prior to retirement,
deflated to constant 2002 pesos. Figure indicates pension values for individuals with 10, 20 and 30 years of
contributions to IMSS. In Panel B, we calculate the nominal wage at each quantile of the IMSS wage distribution
for 60-65 year old men in each year and take the average for that quantile over the preceding five years. Panel
C is constructed similarly using wage distributions from the ENEU baseline samples. See Section 3 for details of
samples and Section 2.3 for details on pension benefits. Average 2002 exchange rate: 9.66 pesos/dollar.
Figure 4. Estado de Cuenta
 
Notes: The box at top right (“Cuánto tengo en mi cuenta individual”) reports total balance. The first row of boxes
in the middle section (“Mi ahorro para el retiro”) pertains to the retirement pension and reports previous balance
(“Saldo anterior”), new contributions (“Aportaciones”), withdrawals (“Retiros”), interest earned (“Rendimientos”),
AFORE commission charged (“Comisiones”), and final balance (“Saldo final”). The second and third rows in the
middle section report balances in the individual’s voluntary savings account and housing account. The bottom
section reports 3-year returns and commissions for each AFORE, as well as the average 5-year net return (at left).




















1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Year
IMSS admin. records ENEU full−time w/ IMSS
ENEU w/ IMSS ENEU permanent w/ IMSS
ENEU w/out IMSS
Notes: Samples are the same as those in Columns 1 and 3-6 of Table 2; refer to that table for details. ENEU totals
are calculated using sampling weights. See Section 3 and Appendix B (online) for details of sample selection.
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real daily salary (constant 2002 pesos)
IMSS admin. records
ENEU household survey
Notes: Samples are “baseline” samples of men: IMSS sample is permanent male workers ages 16-65 in 16 cities
in original ENEU sample; ENEU sample includes full-time male workers ages 16-65 in 16 cities in original ENEU
sample who report receiving IMSS coverage as an employment benefit. Data are from second quarter. Vertical
lines indicate minimum wages in the three minimum-wage zones in Mexico (A, B, C). Bins are 5 pesos wide. The
rightmost bin captures all individuals with reported wages at or above the minimum IMSS topcode over the study
period (from 1991). Average 2002 exchange rate: 9.66 pesos/dollar. See Section 3 and Appendix B (online) for
details of sample selection.
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real daily salary (constant 2002 pesos)
IMSS admin. records
ENEU household survey
Notes: Histogram is similar to Figure 6 but only includes workers with wages less than 200 pesos/day (approx.
$20/day) in constant 2002 pesos. Bins are 2 pesos wide.
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Notes: Samples are “baseline” samples of men, similar to those used in Figure 6 but only including workers with wages less than 200 pesos/day in constant 2002 pesos.
ENEU sample only includes observations for which firm size variable is observed. Vertical lines indicate minimum wages in the three minimum-wage zones in Mexico (A,
B, C). Bins are 2 pesos wide. Average 2002 exchange rate: 9.66 pesos/dollar. See Section 3 and Appendix B (online) for details of sample selection.
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real daily salary (constant 2002 pesos)
Notes: Sample is permanent male workers ages 16-65 in IMSS data in 2405 establishments that can be linked to
a balanced 1993-2003 panel from the Encuesta Industrial Anual (EIA) [Annual Industrial Survey], which excludes
assembly-for-export maquiladora plants. Data are from second quarter. Vertical lines indicate minimum wages in
the three minimum-wage zones in Mexico (A, B, C). Bins are 5 pesos wide. See Section 3 and Appendix B (online)
for details of sample selection.
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real daily salary (constant 2002 pesos)
Notes: Sample is permanent male workers ages 16-65 in IMSS data in 506 establishments that can be linked
to a balanced 1993-2003 panel from the Estad́ısticas Mensuales de la Industria Maquiladora de Exportación
(EMIME) [Monthly Statistics on Maquiladora Export Industry], a dataset made up exclusively of assembly-for-
export maquiladora plants. Data are from second quarter. Vertical lines indicate minimum wages in the three
minimum-wage zones in Mexico (A, B, C). Bins are 5 pesos wide. See Section 3 and Appendix B (online) for details
of sample selection.
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0 50 100 150 200
real daily wage, ages 56−65
IMSS
ENEU
Notes: Densities are estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel and bandwidth 3 pesos for IMSS data and 6 pesos for ENEU data (using Stata kdensity
command). Rows correspond to years 1990, 1997, 2003; columns to age groups 16-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55, 56-65. Wages (on x-axes) are real daily wages
in 2002 pesos. Average 2002 exchange rate: 9.66 pesos/dollar. Samples are baseline samples of men, only including workers with wages less than 200
pesos/day. See Section 3 and Appendix B (online) for details of sample selection.




































1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Year
age 16−25 age 26−35
age 36−45 age 46−55
age 56−65
Notes: Each wage gap is the difference in log median real daily wages between ENEU and IMSS baseline samples,
here calculated separately by age group. See Section 3 and Appendix B (online) for details of sample selection.





























1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Year
age 16−25 age 26−35
age 36−45 age 46−55
age 56−65
Notes: Each wage gap is the difference in log median real daily wages between ENEU and IMSS baseline samples.
To calculate deviated wage gaps, we calculate wage gaps separately by age group-year-metro area, regress them on
a full set of metro area-year dummies, and average the residuals at the age-group level. See Section 3 and Appendix
B (online) for details of sample selection.






























1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Year
age 16−25 age 26−35
age 36−45 age 46−55
age 56−65
Notes: Samples are IMSS and ENEU baseline samples. For details on calculation of Kullback-Liebler divergence
measure, see Section 5 of text. See Section 3 and Appendix B (online) for details of sample selection.


























1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Year
Notes: Figure plots coefficients for 1(age>55)*year interaction term from Column 3 of Table 3. The dotted lines
indicate the 95 percent confidence interval.
Table 1. IMSS pension wealth simulation, men
Real Daily Wage
Years of
Contributions Plan 43 100 200 300 500 1079
35 PRA 399.0 815.0 1626.2 2437.3 4059.7 8759.2
PAYGO 399.0 399.0 603.8 890.2 1483.6 3202.7
30 PRA 399.0 523.4 1044.3 1565.3 2607.1 5625.1
PAYGO 399.0 399.0 510.7 743.3 1238.9 2674.3
25 PRA 399.0 399.0 659.1 987.8 1645.3 3549.9
PAYGO 399.0 399.0 406.9 579.5 965.8 2085.0
20 PRA 88.0 202.4 403.9 605.4 1008.4 2175.7
PAYGO 399.0 399.0 399.0 449.6 749.3 1617.5
15 PRA 51.2 117.8 235.0 352.2 586.6 1265.7
PAYGO 399.0 399.0 399.0 399.0 504.5 1089.1
10 PRA 26.8 61.7 123.1 184.5 307.4 663.2
PAYGO 399.0 399.0 399.0 399.0 399.0 560.7
5 PRA 10.7 24.6 49.0 73.5 122.4 264.2
PAYGO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Notes: Values represent real present discounted value of the future stream of pension benefits in thousands of 2002 pesos under the pre-reform pay-as-you-go
(PAYGO) and personal retirement account (PRA) systems, for a male worker who enters the system on June 30, 1997. 43 pesos is real daily minimum wage
(in Mexico City) in 1997, 1079 pesos is the topcode we impose (corresponding to the lowest real value of IMSS topcode over study period.) See Section 2.3 and
Appendix A.3 (online) for further details.

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. 1990
real avg daily wage 156.41 164.01 173.12 144.00 166.87
(0.09) (1.58) (1.94) (2.62) (1.85)
age 31.81 31.46 32.13 29.98 32.22
(0.01) (0.15) (0.17) (0.29) (0.17)
fraction employed in ests >100 employees 0.52 0.43 0.55 0.18 0.55
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N (raw observations) 1714518 16169 11592 4577 10978
N (population, using weights) 1714518 2578847 1772523 806324 1645229
B. 2000
real avg daily wage 160.28 148.32 161.28 120.88 166.56 155.93
(0.09) (1.31) (1.60) (2.16) (1.80) (1.59)
age 32.77 32.22 32.82 30.94 33.22 32.88
(0.01) (0.14) (0.16) (0.28) (0.17) (0.16)
fraction employed in ests >100 employees 0.58 0.44 0.59 0.10 0.63 0.59
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N (raw observations) 2449442 19171 14063 5108 11918 13246
N (population, using weights) 2449442 3509828 2384267 1125561 2042988 2225318
Notes: All columns focus on wage-earning male workers ages 16-65 in manufacturing, construction, and retail/hotel/restaurant sectors in 16 metropolitan areas
from the original ENEU sample. Column 1 includes IMSS baseline sample; Column 2 includes full ENEU (household survey) sample (satisfying aforementioned
criteria); Column 3 includes employees in ENEU who report receiving IMSS benefit in current employment; Column 4 includes employees in ENEU who report
not receiving IMSS benefit; Column 5 includes employees in ENEU who report receiving IMSS benefit and having a written contract of indefinite duration; and
Column 6 includes employees in ENEU who report receiving IMSS benefit and working at least 35 hours in previous week. Standard errors of means in parentheses.
In IMSS data, the fraction in establishments with >100 employees variable refers to permanent employees. In the ENEU survey, the establishment-size question
asks the total number of employees (without specifying permanent vs. temporary.) For further details, see Section 3 and Appendix B (online).
Table 3. Differential effects on wage gap, men
dep. var.: log(median wage, ENEU) - log(median wage, IMSS)
(1) (2) (3)
1(age > 55)*1988 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.088) (0.065) (0.058)
1(age > 55)*1989 0.024 0.024 0.024
(0.103) (0.083) (0.072)
1(age > 55)*1990 -0.023 -0.023 -0.023
(0.099) (0.071) (0.064)
1(age > 55)*1991 0.045 0.045 0.045
(0.106) (0.070) (0.063)
1(age > 55)*1992 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.090) (0.068) (0.065)
1(age > 55)*1993 -0.032 -0.032 -0.032
(0.100) (0.071) (0.064)
1(age > 55)*1994 0.055 0.055 0.055
(0.103) (0.076) (0.071)
1(age > 55)*1995 -0.024 -0.024 -0.024
(0.101) (0.080) (0.076)
1(age > 55)*1996 0.071 0.071 0.071
(0.102) (0.077) (0.075)
1(age > 55)*1998 0.110 0.110 0.110
(0.092) (0.077) (0.071)
1(age > 55)*1999 0.170 0.170* 0.170**
(0.120) (0.092) (0.082)
1(age > 55)*2000 0.105 0.105 0.105*
(0.104) (0.069) (0.064)
1(age > 55)*2001 0.197** 0.197*** 0.197***
(0.098) (0.071) (0.065)
1(age > 55)*2002 0.180* 0.180** 0.180***
(0.103) (0.071) (0.067)
1(age > 55)*2003 0.173* 0.173** 0.173**
(0.104) (0.075) (0.073)
metro area effects N Y
year effects Y Y
metro-year effects N N Y
age category effects Y Y Y
R-squared 0.14 0.67 0.77
N 1280 1280 1280
Notes: Samples are IMSS and ENEU baseline samples. The dependent variable (wage gap) is the difference in log
median real daily wages between the ENEU and IMSS baseline samples, calculated separately by metro area-age
group-year. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% level. See Section 3 and Appendix B (online) for further details of data processing
Table 4. Differential effects on employment gap, men
dep. var.: log(employment, ENEU) - log(employment, IMSS)
(1) (2) (3)
1(age > 55)*1988 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026
(0.105) (0.098) (0.100)
1(age > 55)*1989 0.048 0.048 0.048
(0.103) (0.097) (0.103)
1(age > 55)*1990 0.077 0.077 0.077
(0.096) (0.088) (0.097)
1(age > 55)*1991 0.109 0.109 0.109
(0.111) (0.110) (0.109)
1(age > 55)*1992 0.054 0.054 0.054
(0.101) (0.096) (0.100)
1(age > 55)*1993 0.098 0.098 0.098
(0.092) (0.087) (0.091)
1(age > 55)*1994 -0.224** -0.224** -0.224**
(0.098) (0.095) (0.101)
1(age > 55)*1995 0.029 0.029 0.029
(0.112) (0.105) (0.107)
1(age > 55)*1996 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.102) (0.100) (0.102)
1(age > 55)*1998 0.045 0.045 0.045
(0.106) (0.099) (0.104)
1(age > 55)*1999 0.031 0.031 0.031
(0.112) (0.104) (0.106)
1(age > 55)*2000 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.094) (0.093) (0.093)
1(age > 55)*2001 0.014 0.014 0.014
(0.110) (0.109) (0.105)
1(age > 55)*2002 0.091 0.091 0.091
(0.113) (0.107) (0.103)
1(age > 55)*2003 0.034 0.034 0.034
(0.094) (0.093) (0.091)
metro area effects N Y
year effects Y Y
metro-year effects N N Y
age category effects Y Y Y
R-squared 0.28 0.37 0.54
N 1280 1280 1280
Notes: Samples are IMSS and ENEU baseline samples, collapsed to metro area-age group-year level. *** 1%, **
5%, * 10% level. See Section 3 and Appendix B (online) for further details of data processing
